Methods are presented to derive with the aid of the computer mathematics software system SageMath the Multivariate Quadratic equation systems (MQ) for the input and output bit variables of a cryptographic S-box starting from its algebraic expressions. Motivation to this work were the results of recent articles [4, 5, 6] which we have verified and extended in an original way, to our knowledge, not yet published elsewhere. At the same time we present results contrary to the published ones which cast serious doubts on the suitability of previously presented formulas, supposed to quantify the resistance of S-boxes against algebraic attacks.
Introduction
In this report we survey main results of the study of Jie Cui et al. [4] of the year 2014 in which the authors claim to have presented a new and concise approach for generating the Multivariate Quadratic equation system (MQ) over GF (2) according to the inverse transformation principle and the affine transformation of Rijndael S-box. Our contribution consists in the presentation of an independent way to automatically derive the same to those of Cui et al. as well as further implicit MQ for the S-box aided by the computer mathematics software system SageMath [1] . We investigate the estimation of the algebraic attack resistance and critically discuss the results stated by Cui et al. SageMath (previously Sage or SAGE, System for Algebra and Geometry Experimentation [2] ) is a free open-source software system for computer mathematics with features covering many aspects of mathematics, including algebra, combinatorics, numerical mathematics, number theory, and calculus. [2] It is licensed under the Gnu General Public License. It builds on top of many existing open-source packages: NumPy, SciPy, matplotlib, Sympy, PolyBoRi, Maxima, GAP, FLINT, R and many more. Their combined power is accessible through a common, Python-based language interface from the command line or a notebook in a web browser. Originally, it is designed by William Stein, still the leader of the SageMath project. He has also invented SageMathCloud [3] for collaborative computational mathematics in the cloud.
Principle of Rijndael S-box RD
We shall repeat the well known principles and algebraic properties [6] explored again in the study of Cui et al. [4] . Looking upon 8-bit bytes as elements in GF (2 8 ), Rijndael's S-box is a mapping S : GF (2 8 ) −→ GF (2 8 ) in form of a combination of an inverse function I(x) which is a multivariate inverse modulo the irreducible polynomial m(t) = t 8 + t 4 + t 3 + t + 1 and an affine transformation function A(x). x is a byte variable consisting of bits x i (i = 0, . . . , 7) , with x 7 symbolizing the most significant bit: x = 7 i=0 x i t i . The modular inverse function I(x) is defined as:
i.e., the modular inverse of 0 is mapped to 0. According to the AES design [7] , the affine transformation A(x) can also be described as a modular polynomial multiplication followed by an addition (XOR) of a constant polynomial:
A(x) = a x mod(t 8 + 1) + b
with a = '1F' and b = '63' . A two-digit hexadecimal number stands for a constant byte, that is a polynomial in t, e.g, '63' for t 6 
The Rijndael S-box can be written as:
Cui's approach to generate an MQ for the Rijndael S-box
Cui et al. [4] (as Courtois and Pieprzyk [6] before them) utilize the Rijndael S-box composition of two functions to derive an MQ for it. With x the input and z the output value, and the intermediate variable y = I(x) they note: z = S RD (x) = A(y) = A(I(x)). Considering the inverse transformation y = I(x), obviously xy = 1 when x not equal 0, which reads in polynomial form:
The above modulo division is then analytically performed and a comparison of coefficients of terms of the same order in t k , 0 ≤ k ≤ 7, leads to the first eight multivariate quadratic equations for Rijndael S-box in the pages 2483 and 2484 of the paper of Cui et al. [4] The authors give all the steps and in-between results of the complete length of the calculation. They formulate and evaluate two additional equations of the byte variables to define the S-box completely. Doing so, Cui et al. replicate results already presented in 2002 by Courtois and Pieprzyk in the extended version of [6] .
We will model and evaluate the same equations in the next section with the open source computer mathematics tool Sage.
Rijndael S-box coded in Sage
In order to work with polynomials like x = 7 i=0 x i t i Sage provides modules to construct rings of multivariate polynomials. In the previous section the polynomials x, y, and z were introduced. In line 1 of listing 1 a variable for the number of bits is defined for convenience. In line 2 a list of strings for the names of the coefficients of the three byte polynomials is generated (['x0', 'x1', .., 'z7']).
Listing 1: Byte polynomials over a quotient ring Byte . <t > = P . q u o t i e n t _ r i n g ( p^8 + p^4 + p^3 + p + 1)
In line 3 a Boolean polynomial ring for these coefficients is constructed which assigns GF (2) properties to them. In line 4 the coefficient names are made available as variables. In line 5 a polynomial ring over the Boolean polynomial ring B is constructed and from that, in line 6, the final quotient ring Byte with modulus m(t). In lines 7 and 8, lists of coefficient variables of the byte polynomials are created for convenience. With the help of these lists, in lines 9 and 10, finally, the polynomials x and y are modeled. Now one can already evaluate the product xy in Sage with the commands:
In the second line we used the list() attribute to get the coefficients of each power of t in equation E3. With the last command latex(eqs3) one gets a list of the equations printed in a form ready to copy-and-paste directly into a L A T E X document. Due to the usage of the quotient ring, E3 is of degree 7, the length of list eqs3 (the number of coefficients) is 8. With Sage we have gotten the following equations which compare with the system of equations with number (3) in the paper of Cui et al. [4] : 
These equations are practically identical to equations (3) of the paper of Cui et al., with the only difference being in the order of summands within each equation. The equations (4) are terms of the Sage object list eqs3. In the enumeration the zeroth term of the list (eqs3 [0] ) is the constant term of the polynomial, the first (eqs3 [1] ) is the coefficient of the term of first order and so on.
Cui et al. proceeded with the generation of the next set of equations for Rijndael's S-box, the affine transformation. From equation (2) 
since a 255 a mod(t 8 + 1) = 1. Written in the bit variables equation (5) translates to:
We can substitute for y equations (6) into (4) to get the final form of the first eight equations representing Rijndael S-box. In Sage the values substitution is accomplished with the help of a so called dictionary. By using equation (5) the code in Listing 2 generates this dictionary, called eqs4.
Listing 2: Generate a dictionary to substitute y variables The first line sets up a quotient ring modulo t 8 + 1. The next four lines define the byte variable z and the two constant polynomials a and b in this ring (with generator u). Equation (5) simply reads a^255 * (z + b) in the code. The dictionary is constructed in the last line. The result is shown in Listing 3.
Listing 3: Dictionary to substitute y variables { y7 : z6 + z4 + z1 , y6 : z5 + z3 + z0 , y5 : z7 + z4 + z2 , y4 : z6 + z3 + z1 , y3 : z5 + z2 + z0 , y2 : z7 + z4 + z1 + 1 , y1 : z6 + z3 + z0 , y0 : z7 + z5 + z2 + 1}
The substitution of y in equation (4) via the dictionary succeeds with the following:
The result is again a list, the members of which give the first set of eight multivariate quadratic equations of the S-box by setting the byte variable product equal to 1. They read:
The last system of equations (7) is identical to the system (5) of Cui et al.
Those equations with zero constant term (7 out of 8 above) are true with probability equal to 1. The 8th equation is true only when x = 0, so that this equation is true with a probability 255/256. Furthermore for ∀ x = 0 x = x 2 y. Obviously this last equation is true also when x = 0, so that one can write:
. .
Cui et al. take the last of the above and write two symmetrical equations to generate an additional set of 16 equations for the Rijndael S-box. The equations they take are:
We develop the two last equations to get the needed additional 16 equations for the implicated variables. We also substitute in these equations y by using (6) in form of the dictionary in listing 3.
The result is a list with the following equations, which are practically the equations (7) of Cui et al. written in the reverse order than that of Cui's paper. Cui et al. begin with the expression corresponding to the highest order term of E7 while the sage list begins with the constant term.
The above equations (10) are identical with those in (7) of Cui et al. [4] with a couple of minimal differences which we attribute to typographical errors in the paper of Cui et al. These are the following: In both the second and third from the top equations (7) in the paper of Cui et al. there is missing one term each time: These are the terms: x 3 z 7 and x 2 z 3 respectively. In the seventh equation from the top of (7) there is a superfluous term: x 6 . Similarly, we write:
and get the next block of eight equations for the Rijndael S-box. These are to compare with the system (8) of Cui et al.
Here we have a couple of discrepancies which we again attribute to typographical mistakes in the reference paper. Our first equation in the set (11) is one-term shorter (has 32 terms) than the corresponding equation in (8) of Cui et al. [4] which has 33 terms. The term z 7 on the right side of Cui's equivalent equation is wrong and should be removed. We remind again that our first equation in (11) is the last in (8) of the reference paper, as Cui's equations are written in reverse than our order. Also Cui's third equation counting from the bottom (equivalent to our third from the top of (11)) has minor mistakes in comparison to our equation: This equation contains wrongly the terms x 2 and x 7 while the terms x 0 , x 4 and x 5 contained in our corresponding equation are missing. In the fourth from the bottom equation in Cui's set (8) there is missing one term x 3 z 7 , and so the equation has one term less than our corresponding equation. The rest of terms and equations are identical. Using the Sage model of this S-box it is easy to count the number of equations, the number of terms in each equation and determining the minimal and maximal number of terms, as well as the total number of different terms, as shown in Listing 4. Courtois and Pieprzyk [6] state that these 23 equations are linearly independent. Nonetheless, using the SAT solver it can be demonstrated that the last 16 equations (9) only are already sufficient to establish just the S-box value table of 256 solutions. For the solution of the 16 equation system the SAT solver takes ca. 0.7 s CPU time on the same computer. The 16 equations describing the Rijndael S-box have between 28 and 49 monomials per equation and, in total, 81 different monomials.
Algebraic attacks and S-box optimization
For quantifying the resistance against algebraic attacks for r equations in t terms over GF (2 n ) Cui et al. [4] have used the criterion of Cheon and Lee [9] which defines the Resistance against Algebraic Attacks (RAA) Γ as:
Courtois and Pieprzyk [6] use another criterion
(note the brackets ⌈ ⌉ in the exponent indicating the ceiling function). 1 The value of these criteria should reflect the difficulty of solving multivariate equations. For the Rijndael S-box we counted 23 equations and, in total, 81 different monomials. Therefore, it has Γ = (29/4) To generate a harder to solve equation system Cui et al. [4] have introduced a more complicated Rijndael S-box structure which they name AffineInverse-Affine (AIA) structure. This S-box will be explored in detail in the next two sections.
MQ of the AIA structure S-box in Sage
In Cui, Huang, et al. (2011) [5] , a new Rijndael S-box structure named AffineInverse-Affine (AIA) is designed in order to try to increase the algebraic complexity of said S-box.
A different affine transformation (2) with a = '5B' and b = '5D' is chosen. This transformation is applied before and after the inversion step:
Cui et al. [4] derive a multivariate quadratic equation system of S AIA using the coefficients of the polynomial expression of the S-box. They write up the equation system with indices for rounds and input bytes for the AES algorithm (without further using them) which will, for clarity, be omitted in what follows. As before, by x is denoted the input byte variable of the S-box function. Intermediate variables are denoted by y 0 , y 1 , . . . , y 253 and the output variable by z. According to the polynomial expression of the new AIA S-box, the S-box transformation can be described by the following quadratic equations over GF(2 8 ): 
1 Parameter n could be interpreted as number of dependent variables, see section 6.
Cui et al. [4] define the function g by the polynomial expression of their S-box. They state to list its coefficients in their Table 1 which is taken from Cui, Huang, et al. [5] and coincides with Table 3 in the latter. But inexplicably, these coefficients do not correspond to the polynomial expression of their S-box S AIA . Although, Cui, Huang, et al. [5] list in their preceding Table  2 In lines 3 and 4 lists of strings for the names of coefficients for the byte variables x, z, and y 0 , . . . , y 252 are generated. Then, as in Listing 1, in line 5 a Boolean polynomial ring for these coefficients is constructed, assigning GF (2) properties to them, in line 6 the coefficients are made available as variables and in line 7 a polynomial ring over the Boolean polynomial ring B is constructed and from that in line 8, eventually, the quotient ring Byte with modulus m(t).
In lines 9 to 11 lists of the coefficient variables of the byte polynomials are created for convenience. For the y-variables the coefficients are grouped byte-wise in sub-lists. With the help of these lists in lines 12 to 14, finally, the polynomials of the byte variables are modeled. For the y-variables a list of polynomials is used.
In the next Sage code block (Listing 8), the coefficients of the polynomial expression of S AIA are given in hexadecimal notation as a list of strings which is transformed to a list of the constant polynomials that enter g (15): The first equation is discarded since it is only true with probability 255/256 (false if x = 0). This gives for the new AIA S-box 2,039 equations, with between 3 and 1,034 monomials per equation. These equations have in total 18,232 different monomials. In order to estimate the resistance against algebraic attacks, also the intermediate variables were taken into account by interpreting the parameter n in the definitions (12) and (13) as estimation for RAA.
2 Also, the CPU time to evaluate all 256 solutions of this MQ with a SAT solver is ca. 7 s, which is 14 times the time used for the original Rijndael S-box.
Cui et al. [4] count a totally different number of equations and terms based on the byte variables, not on their polynomial coefficients, which contradicts the scheme applied to the Rijndael S-box with which they compare, and therefore, is misleading.
Further, this method used by Cui et al. [4] to derive an MQ for their AIA S-box applies to any S-box using the coefficients of its polynomial expression. Therefore, the resulting numbers of equations and terms is deceptive as criterion for the estimation of algebraic attack resistance and inapt to differentiate the quality of byte S-boxes. To substantiate this point, we have derived such an MQ for the original Rijndael S-box by using its polynomial expression in equation ( 
The same Sage code (Listings 7, 8, and 9) was used with an adapted table of the polynomial expression coefficients given in Listing 11.
Listing 11: Polynomial expression coefficients of RD S-box sbt = [ ' 63 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ' , ' 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ' , ' 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ' , ' 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ' , ' 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ' , ' 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ' , ' 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ' , ' 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 8 F ' , ' 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ' , ' 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ' , ' 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ' , ' 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 B5 ' , ' 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ' , ' 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 ' , ' 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 F4 ' , ' 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 25 00 00 00 F9 00 09 05 00 ']
It is found that this MQ of the Rijndael S-box has the same number of equations with the same number of different monomials as the MQ of S AIA resulting in equally high, misleading Γ values. Also, the SAT solver needs the same 7 s CPU time to find the solutions of this MQ.
In contrast, we will show in the next section that it is easy (at least by using computer mathematics) to derive a much simpler MQ for the AIA Sbox which shows that its resistance against algebraic attacks according to the effort of a SAT solver is not that much greater than that of the original Rijndael S-box. But the RAA criteria seem to exaggerate the hardness of that simpler MQ.
Concise MQ for the AIA S-box in Sage
Building on the Sage code presented so far we derive a much simpler MQ for the AIA S-box. Its resistance against algebraic attacks according to the RAA criterion is greater than that of the original Rijndael S-box but over-estimates the time it takes to solve the system with a SAT solver.
For the inversion step we now use, temporarily, two intermediate byte variables y 0 and y 1 , named yy[0] and yy [1] in the Sage code. Their coefficients shall be y 0 , . . . , y 7 The last two equations in (17) are the only other additional (fully quadratic) MQ (besides y 0 y 1 = 1) for the inversion as stated already by Courtois and Pieprzyk in the extended version of [6] (compare also Cheon and Lee [9] ). These additional equations are necessary to completely define the S-box S AIA . Without them the system is under-defined, as, for example, the solution with a SAT solver shows. In Sage the equations (17) read 
with a = '5B' and b = '5D' . In Sage we formulate
Listing 12: Generate dictionary to substitute y variables 1 Baff . <u > = P . q u o t i e n t _ r i n g ( p^8 + 1 ) 2 a = Baff ( list ( ZZ ( '0 x5B ' ). str (2)[::
The right hand side of equation (18) reads a * x + b in line 6 of Listing 12 and the rhs of (19) is a^255 * (z + b) in line 7. Both their coefficients are inserted into the same dictionary eqs14. The result is shown in Listing 13.
Listing 13: Combined dictionary to substitute y variables { y15 : z4 + z5 + z6 , y14 : z3 + z4 + z5 , y13 : z2 + z3 + z4 + 1 , y12 : z1 + z2 + z3 , y11 : z0 + z1 + z2 , y10 : z0 + z1 + z7 + 1 , y9 : z0 + z6 + z7 , y8 : z5 + z6 + z7 + 1 , y7 : x1 + x3 + x4 + x6 + x7 , y6 : x0 + x2 + x3 + x5 + x6 + 1 , y5 : x1 + x2 + x4 + x5 + x7 , y4 : x0 + x1 + x3 + x4 + x6 + 1 , y3 : x0 + x2 + x3 + x5 + x7 + 1 , y2 : x1 + x2 + x4 + x6 + x7 + 1 , y1 : x0 + x1 + x3 + x5 + x6 , y0 : x0 + x2 + x4 + x5 + x7 + 1}
Applying this substitutions in Sage and, thereby, getting rid of the intermediate byte variables is straight forward 
Conclusion
SageMath is a very appropriate, powerful computer mathematics tool to analyze cryptographic problems formulated with byte variables as polynomials in a quotient ring. Sage draws its strength in this area mainly from the integration of the PolyBoRi library [1, 10] .
We have used Sage to demonstrate how to produce various polynomial Multivariate Quadratic equations systems (MQ) for the Rijndael S-box and similar S-boxes in a simple and straightforward manner. Using the flexible structures and interface of Sage one can easily count the parameters of the resulting polynomial systems, like the number of different monomials in the system, the length of the equations, the frequency of the appearance of certain terms or variables in equations etc. We have used this facility to derive the necessary inputs for the estimation of the Resistance against Algebraic Attacks (RAA) according to Cui et al. [4] , as well as to Courtois and Pieprzyk [6] . Parallelly, we performed numerical experiments by solving the corresponding MQ with a SAT solver in order to check if the formulas for the RAA predict a scaling accordingly to the solver efforts.
Our results in this respect are revealing. We couldn't validate the pre-dicted reduced hardness for a system to solve with increasing number of equations and number of independent monomials in the polynomial systems which both the formulas forecast. There is in fact a slight increased solver effort when one reduces from the 23 Rinjndael s-box equations to the 16 but quantitatively this is badly represented in both formulas. Cui et al. constructed a complicated algebraic expression for a new Rijndael S-box (starting from its Lagrange polynomial expression with 255 coefficients) which necessarily leads to a great number of equations and independent monomials in the resulting MQ. On this basis they thought they have demonstrated a remarkable new S-box practically not possible to solve according to the here discussed and by us criticized as inappropriate RAA formulas. However there are gaps in their concept arising from inconsistency in their comparison principle as well as the lack of thoroughness in the investigation of the properties of the new algebraic expression which we showed can be equivalently written in a much simpler form leading to a polynomial system nearly as easy solved as that of the original Rijndael S-box.
We also mapped the original Rijndael S-box with its 9 Lagrange coefficients on the AIA form of Cui et al. which gave us as result the same huge number of variables and multitude of polynomials which should be a prove that this way to create especially hard cryptographic S-boxes is not the right one.
In this way we showed that the, by Cui et al. so called, improved AIA S-box is in fact at most marginally an improvement. resistance estimations presented in this work. We conclude, that in order to assess the resistance of an S-box against algebraic attacks it is not sufficient to derive some multivariate quadratic equation system and analyze it. To really find an estimation one has to show that the derived MQ is optimal for solving and, thus, attacking it.
